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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Marco Antonio Jimenez appeals from the district court's orders denying
his motion to grant public funds for the appointment of an expert to assist in his
motion to suppress, and denying his suppression motion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinas
On October 27, 2006, two men entered a Maverik convenience store in
Rupert and robbed it, taking about $90 cash from the store clerk at gunpoint.
(Presentence Report, pp.1-2.) Jimenez was subsequently arrested (R., pp.1 l 14), and charged in a criminal complaint with one count of robbery, and a penalty
enhancement for using a firearm while committing that crime (R., pp.1-4). A
preliminary hearing began on November 22, 2006, in which the testimony of
several witnesses, including Minidoka Deputy Sheriff Joe Moore, was heard. (R.,
pp.27-29.)
Deputy Moore testified that he was on patrol at night traveling east on
Highway 25 about three miles west of Paul, Idaho, when he received a radio
dispatch that a robbery had just occurred at the Rupert Maverik store. (R., p.73.)
As he drove toward Rupert on Highway 25, he saw a vehicle traveling the
opposite direction well below the speed limit (42 in a 55 zone) which caused him
to be suspicious. (Id.) The deputy slowed down to 35 miles per hour so his
vehicle would pass the other in an area lighted by a small gas station and
convenience store named "Stimpy's." (Id.) When the suspect vehicle passed
Deputy Moore in the lighted area, he saw four Hispanics in the car with bald

heads, who reacted with "quite a bit" of surprise (i.e., wide eyes, open mouths) at
seeing the deputy's vehicle. (R., p.74.)

The deputy continued to watch the

suspect car in his side mirror after the vehicles passed, and saw "a lot of furtive
movements," including shifting around (but not changing seats) and moving by
persons in both the front and back seats of the vehicle. (R., pp.74-75.) After he
turned his patrol car around and followed the suspect vehicle, Deputy Moore saw
more furtive movements, although not as exaggerated as he had seen in his side
mirror.

(Tr., p.75.)

Finally, Deputy Moore noticed that the suspect vehicle

"signaled for a longer distance than usual before turning into the right lane where
the highway becomes a four lane highway near Paul," which indicated to the
deputy that the driver was over-exaggerated in trying to do everything right. (Id.)
Deputy Moore initiated a traffic stop of that vehicle. (Id.)
At the end of that day's testimony, the trial court granted the state's motion
to continue the preliminary hearing to enable the state to call other witnesses.
(R., p.29.) When the hearing resumed several weeks later, Jimenez waived his
right to a preliminary hearing. (R., pp.32-33.) The state filed an Information
against Jimenez in district court, again charging him with robbery and the firearm
enhancement. (R., pp.35-39.) Jimenez filed a motion for public funds to hire an
expert witness to assist him in a suppression hearing by challenging Deputy
Moore's ability to have observed enough to justify a stop of the vehicle Jimenez
and three others rode in shortly after the robbery.

(R., pp.44-56.) After a

hearing, in which the district court and parties relied on the preliminary hearing
testimony of Deputy Moore (319107 Tr., pp.14-29)' the court issued a

memorandum decision denying Jimenez's request for public funds for an expert
witness to assist him in a suppression hearing (R., pp.72-79). Jimenez also filed
a motion to suppress (R., pp.62-65), which the district court denied after
conducting a full hearing (R., pp.93-95; 4/16/07 Tr., pp.31-90).
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jimenez entered a conditional guilty plea to
robbery, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his two motions. (R., pp.112118.) The district court sentenced Jimenez to ten years fixed followed by an
indeterminate term of fifteen years, for a unified sentence of twenty-five years;
the court suspended that sentence and retained jurisdiction over Jimenez. (R.,
p.136-143.) Jimenez has filed a timely appeal from that judgment. (R., p.150152, 161-166.)

ISSUES
Jimenez states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Jimenez's request for funds to hire an expert to explain factors that
would affect Deputy Moore's ability to perceive what he claimed he
saw when Deputy Moore's purported observations were vital to the
district court's denial of Mr. Jimenez's motion to suppress in
violation of Mr. Jimenez's Fourteenth Amendment Right to due
process?
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Jimenez's motion
2.
to suppress as Deputy Moore's suspicion upon which he justified
his warrantless stop was not objectively reasonable?
(Appellant's brief, p.1 I.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Jimenez failed to show error in the district court's denial of his request
1.
for funds to hire an expert to assist in his suppression hearing?
Did the district court correctly apply the law to the facts of this case in
2.
denying Jimenez's motion to suppress?

ARGUMENT

I.
Jimenez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Denial Of
His Reauest For Funds To Hire An Expert To Assist In His
Suppression Hearing
A.

Introduction
Jimenez claims he was entitled to public funds to hire an expert to assist

him in his suppression hearing by providing "testimony about factors that would
influence a person's ability to make the observations Deputy Moore claimed to
make under the conditions upon which he claimed to make them." (Appellant's
brief, p.12.) Review of the record and applicable law shows that Jimenez has
established no error.
B.

Standard of Review
The question of whether expert or investigative services should be

provided by the state pursuant to I.C.

3

19-852 is committed to the sound

discretion of the trial court. State v. Olin, 103 ldaho 391, 395, 648 P.2d 203, 207
(1982); State v. Kay, 108 ldaho 661, 668, 701 P.2d 281, 288 (Ct. App. 1985).
"'[A] denial of a defendant's request for expert assistance or investigative
assistance will not be disturbed absent a showing the trial court abused its
discretion by rendering a decision which is clearly erroneous and unsupported by
the circumstances of the case."' State v. Murphy, 133 ldaho 489, 492, 988 P.2d
715, 718 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting OJn,

103 ldaho at 395, 648 P.2d at 207).

C.

Law Applicable To lndipent Defendants' Requests To Appoint An Expert
At State Expense
ldaho Code 5 19-852(a) provides:

(a) A needy person who is . . . under formal charge of having
committed . . . a serious crime, is entitled:
(1) to be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a
person having his own counsel is so entitled; and
(2) to be provided with the necessary services and facilities
of representation (including investigation and other
preparation). The attorney, services, and facilities and the
court costs shall be provided at public expense to the extent
that the person is, at the time the court determines need,
unable to provide for their payment.
Expert testing under I.C.

3

19-852 implicates a criminal defendant's fair

trial rights because it affects his ability to present a defense.

m, 103 ldaho at

394, 648 P.2d at 206 (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)
("states must, as a matter of equal protection, provide indigent prisoners with the
basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal, when those tools are available for
a price to other prisoners"), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (due
process requires access to basic tools of an adequate defense)).

"[Wlhat

constitutes the basic tools or necessary services of an adequate defense has not
been clearly defined, and may indeed vary from case to case."

m, 103 ldaho

at 394,648 P.2d at 206. As summarized by the ldaho Supreme Court:
The constitution does not require a state to provide expert or
investigative assistance merely because a defendant requests it. A
defendant's request for expert or investigative services should be
reviewed in light of all circumstances and be measured against the
standard of "fundamental fairness" embodied in the due process
clause. Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a
particular purpose in an indigent's defense, the trial court must

determine whether the funds are necessary in the interest of
justice.
State v. Lovelace, 140 ldaho 53, 65, 90 P.3d 278, 290 (2003) (citations omitted).
D.

Jimenez Has Shown No Error In The District Court's Denial Of His
Request To Appoint An Expert At State Expense To Assist In His
Suppression Hearinq
After considering the preliminary hearing testimony of Deputy Moore, and

the argument of the parties (319107 Tr., p.14, L.l - p.26, L.16), the district court
issued a memorandum decision and order (R., pp.72-79) denying Jimenez's
request for public funds to retain an expert to testify about whether Deputy Moore
could have made the observations he testified about, given the speeds of the
vehicles, and the lighting conditions in the area that night. Attached to this
Respondent's brief as Appendix A is the district court's memorandum decision
and order, which the state fully incorporates and relies upon, in part, for its
response to Jimenez's appellate challenge to the district court's ruling.

In

addition to relying upon the district court's memorandum decision and order, the
state makes the following supplemental arguments and comments.
Jimenez argues that the district court decided his motion for funds for an
expert witness under I.C. § 19-852(a) (provision of "necessary services") by
relying on I.R.E. 702' (whether the offered testimony will "assist the trier of fact"),
instead of the due process and equal protection standard provided in State v.

m, 103 ldaho 391, 394, 648 P.2d 203, 206 (1982).
'

See Appellant's brief,

I.R.E. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."

pp.14-17 ("The district court analyzed the claim in light of I.C. § 19-852 and ldaho
Rule of Evidence 702 -- the rule authorizing the use of expert testimony;"
I

"Furthermore, the district court's reliance upon I.R.E. 702 in deciding the motion
I

for funds was inconsistent with the Olin standards.")
However, the district court clearly understood the "fundamental fairness"
and "due process" characteristics of Jimenez's request for funds for services, as
it stated in its "applicable law" section:
A defendant's request for expert or investigative services should be
reviewed in light of all circumstances and be measured against the
standard of "fundamental fairness" embedded in the due process
clause. Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a
particular purpose in an indigent's defense, the trial court must
determine whether the funds are necessary in the interest of
justice.

(R., p.76 (emphasis added) (quoting State v. Lovelace, 140 ldaho 53, 65, 90
I

1

P.3d 278, 290 (2003)))
I
I

Far from ignoring the standards set forth in

m,the

district court's recitation from Lovelace, as highlighted above, is taken from the
~
J
same case Q

relied upon and quoted in divulging its standard -- State v.

Powers, 96 ldaho 833,838, 537 P.2d 1369,1374 (1975). S e e m , 103 ldaho at
395, 648 P.2d at 207 (quoting Powers); Lovelace, 140 ldaho at 65, P.3d at 290
(same standard recited and attributed to Powers).
Moreover, in its "analysis and decision" section, the district court made no
mention of I.R.E. 702 (or even its "assist the trier of fact" standard) and reiterated
at the end of its decision, "The court finds that denial of the services of an expert
witness at this stage of the proceedings will not deny the defendant of the

fundamental fairness required by the due process clause."' (R., p.78 (emphasis
added).) In sum, Jimenez's suggestion that the district court employed the wrong
standard is not well-taken.3
Having (incorrectly) argued that the district court improperly based its
decision on the I.R.E. 702 standard, Jimenez next claims the district court erred
because Rule 702 cannot be used, inasmuch as "[tlhe rules of evidence are not
applicable in determining preliminary questions of fact necessary to determine
the admissibility of evidence when the district court is the trier of fact," citing
I.R.E. 101(e)(l) and 104(a). (Appellant's brief, p.17.) Contrary to Jimenez's
argument, even if the district court had based its decision to deny funds for an
expert witness at Jimenez's suppression hearing solely on I.R.E. 702, such a
ruling would not have run counter to I.R.E. 101 and 104

--

the admission of

Deputy Moore's testimony (vis-a-vis the weight) was not predicated upon the
expert witness's proffered testimony.
The district court concluded that providing funds for an expert witness to
assist Jimenez at his suppression hearing "is not necessary in the interest of
justice," an obvious reference to the standard set forth in Lovelace. (R., p.78;
see R., p.76.) The court explained:
The closing speed of the vehicles can be readily determined
arithmetically as can the time the deputy could have realistically
observed the suspect's car. 77 miles per hour equals 112.9 feet

' Although no reference was made to I.R.E. 702 in the district court's "analysis
and decision" portion of its memorandum decision and order, it did quote that rule
in its earlier "applicable law" section. (R., p.76.)
it is unclear to the state how, as Jimenez seems to contend, the proffered
testimony could fail to "assist the trier of fact" under I.R.E. 702, yet be considered
"necessary services" under I.C. § 19-852.

per second. The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what
he observed at night while the vehicles were passing each other
and then through his rearview mirror after the vehicles had passed
can, if necessary to decide this case, be determined by the court
without the assistance of an expert witness. It is the fact-finder's
function to judge the credibility of witnesses.
The district court found that the testimony of an expert to challenge the
credibility of Deputy Moore's observations at the suppression hearing was not
necessary. The speed and distance dynamics were already before the court (R.,
p.78; see 3/9/07 Tr., pp.16, 23-24), and the court was confident that it could
gauge whether the officer's testimony about what he could see as the two
vehicles passed was credible -- presumably by both its own common experience
of viewing passing cars at nighttime in similarly lit conditions, as well as the
perceived veracity of Deputy Moore's testimony.
Considering the reasoning of the district court's memorandum decision
and order (see Appendix A), and the above arguments and comments, Jimenez
has failed to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion in denying his
request for public funds to hire an expert to assist him at his suppression hearing.

II.
The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts Of This Case In
Denvin~Jimenez's Motion To Suppress
A.

Introduction
Jimenez was an occupant in a vehicle stopped in relation to a late-night

armed robbery at the Rupert Maverik convenience store. After conducting a
suppression hearing in which Deputy Moore testified at length, the trial court
denied Jimenez's motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a result of the
stop, determining that the stop was constitutionally reasonable. (4/16/07 Tr.,
p.84, L . l l - p.90, L.8.)
On appeal, Jimenez challenges the trial court's ruling, contending Deputy
Moore's testimony fell short of establishing a reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle Jimenez rode in.

However, a review of Deputy Moore's testimony

establishes that the district court correctly concluded the officer had reasonable
suspicion to conduct the traffic stop.
B.

Standard of Review
On review of a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate court defers to

the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence.
The district court's legal determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been met is subject to free review. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 916
P.2d 1284 (Ct. App. 1996).

C.

The District Court Correctlv Applied The Law To The Facts In Concludinq
Deputv Moore Had A Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion To Conduct A
Traffic Stop Of The Vehicle Jimenez Occupied
1.

Applicable Law

A police officer may, without violating constitutional rights, make an
investigatory stop of an individual if that officer has a reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity is underway. Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880
(1968). He may do so even though there is no probable cause to make an

4. Such a seizure must be justified by a reasonable and articulable

arrest.

suspicion on the part of the police officer that the person to be stopped has
committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Rawlinas, 121 ldaho 930, 932,
829 P.2d 520 (1992) (citing Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 103 S.Ct. 1319
(1972)).
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is that the officer can articulate
specific facts which, along with the reasonable inferences from those facts, justify
the suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity. State v. Galleqos,
120 ldaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1992); State v. Martinez, 129 ldaho 426,
429, 925 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Ct. App. 1996). This standard is less demanding than
the probable cause standard. Galleqos, 120 ldaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951;
Martinez, 129 ldaho at 429, 925 P.2d at 1128. Whether the police officer had the
requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop is determined on the basis of
the totality of the circumstances. Rawlinas, 121 ldaho at 932 (citing

United

States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 41 1, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981)). If the officer is reasonably
mistaken about the facts when he detains a person, such mistake does not

render the officer's suspicion unreasonable. See Illinois v. Rodriquez, 497 U.S.
177, 185-86 (1990); State v. Buhler, 137 ldaho 685, 688, 52 P.3d 329, 332 (Ct.
App. 2002); State v. McCarthy, 133 ldaho 119, 124, 982 P.2d 954, 959 (Ct. App.
1999); State v. Hawkins, 131 ldaho 396, 401, 958 P.2d 22, 27 (Ct. App. 1998).
Where the stop is not based upon any observations made by the stopping
officer but upon a message he receives from police dispatch, the appropriate
inquiry is "whether the information given to the police, which underlay the
dispatcher's message, included articulable facts supporting a reasonable
suspicion that the occupant[s] of [the] vehicle [were] involved in criminal activity."
State v. Sevy, 129 ldaho 613,615, 930 P.2d 1358, 1360 (Ct. App. 1997).
2.

Deputv Moore's Testimony

In his suppression hearing testimony, Deputy Moore explained he had just
finished eating when he received an "all-call" (dispatch to all deputies) about a
robbery that had just occurred at the Maverik store in Rupert. (4116107 Tr., p.36,
Ls. 14-23.) According to Deputy Moore, the dispatcher advised the robbery had
been committed by two Hispanics with "hooded sweatshirts, bandannas, stocking
caps, one had a dark-colored pistol . . . I think it was black is what they said."
(4116107 Tr., p.37, L.19 - p.38, L.22.) He was about 8.6 miles away from that
location, so he began driving his patrol vehicle toward Rupert, going east on
Highway 25 with his overhead lights on. (4116107 Tr., p.37, Ls.4-6; p.39, Ls.812.) Deputy Moore traveled about a half-mile, then he turned off his overhead
lights, and began checking vehicles as he passed them on the highway. (4116107
Tr., p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.7.) After passing two or three vehicles, he noticed a

vehicle that was traveling at 42 miles an hour in a 55 mile an hour zone, which
drew his attention. (4116107 Tr., p.41, Ls.5-8.) In Deputy Moore's experience,
going that far below the speed limit could typically be due to a driver being older,
a driver being under the influence, or a driver attempting to avoid officers and
lessen suspicion. (4116107 Tr., p.41, L.12 - p.42, L 20.)
Deputy Moore testified that, given the time, distance and direction he
traveled on Highway 25 after the robbery was reported to have occurred, and
where he saw the suspect vehicle, placed that vehicle within the "window of
possibility to have traveled from Rupert to that location." (4116107 Tr., p.41, L.21

- p.43, L.24; p.47, L.25 - p.48, L.5; p.54, Ls.18-21.) In seeing the suspect vehicle
coming toward him, Deputy Moore slowed his patrol vehicle down to 35 miles per
hour so he would pass the other vehicle in the lighted area around Stimpy's
convenience store and gas station. (4116107 Tr., p.44, Ls.10-21. R., p.73.) As
the vehicles passed each other, Deputy Moore saw four individuals in the
suspect vehicle, with bald heads, sitting in a low-ride position, which he
described as riding low in the car, sitting with their shoulders level with the seats
"where what you see mostly is the head." (4116107 Tr., p.46, Ls.4-11.) Deputy
Moore later explained that the report of bandannas worn by Hispanic individuals
committing a robbery might have indicated "some type of gang-type thing" that is
also related to the culture of low-riding. (4116107 Tr., p.53, L.25 - p.54, L.8.)
Deputy Moore testified that the persons in the suspect vehicle watched
him as they went by with varying expressions, and that he was driving a 2004
Ford Expedition that was marked as a sheriffs vehicle on the side and had

overhead lights on its top. (4116107 Tr., p.46, L.16 - p.47, L.7.) Moore stated that
he could see the occupants of the suspect vehicle before he passed them and
was able to observe them for a second after he passed them. (4116107 Tr., p.47,
Ls.21-24.) As he was passing the vehicle, "all four seemed to look at [Deputy
Moore] and had varying expressions." (4116107 Tr., p.47, Ls.14-17.) Deputy
Moore continued to slow down, and as soon as the suspect vehicle passed he
looked in his side mirror and saw "quite a bit of movement, turning around,
looking . . . blust bouncing around inside," which was unusual. (4116107 Tr., p.48,
Ls.13-22.)

When asked to describe the "furtive" movements he observed,

Deputy Moore explained:
When I looked into my mirror I could see subjects turning
around and looking at me, subjects turning and talking to each
other in a rushed manner, and that's when I decided, okay, I'm
going to turn around and check this out.
And that observation happened as you were passing them at
Q.
Stimpy's?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Did that observation continue as you followed them?

A.

Once I caught up to them, which was about Fifth Street or

SO.

And why was that furtive movement significant, based on
your training and experience?
Q.

A.

I don't normalty experience that on a vehicle that I turn on.

Q.

People don't tend to get excited and start - -

A.

Jumping around or moving around in a car really fast, no, sir.

Q.

What does that suggest to you?

Quite possibly there might be some reason for it, such as to
A.
remove clothing, hide weapons, secure items that they don't want
to be found.
With respect to the Hispanic individuals, you also were able
Q.
to observe that as you passed them at Stimpy's?
A.

I did.

Q.

Was that significant based on the call you'd received?

It was significant that -- it was a fact that I felt like I needed to
A.
check out.
(4116108 Tr., p.55, L.7 - p.56, L.'l2.)
Deputy Moore noticed that the suspect vehicle did something unusual by
following the law to an unusual extent in signaling a right-hand lane change prior
to where the highway divides from one lane into two as it enters the City of Paul.
(4116107 Tr., p.49, L . l l - p.52, L.18.)

He explained that, in his experience,

people who speed sometimes turn their blinker on way before they get to their
turn, as do people who have been drinking. (4116107 Tr., p.53, Ls.2-6.)
3.

The District Court's Decision

At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district court announced
its decision, and explained:
So when you look at this thing in the totality of all the
circumstances I come back to a couple questions, and admittedly
this is a close case. One is, police officers are paid to be
suspicious. Let's start with that general proposition that that's part
of what the job is. Two, this officer was on a heightened suspicion
because there had within minutes prior been an armed robbery at
the Maverick [sic]. Three, it's in the middle of the night: It's one
o'clock or thereabouts in the middle of the night. He starts towards
the scene of the robbery, initially passed two cars that did not raise
any suspicions, but in the context of things there's kind of a lack of
suspicion. The officer testified he saw three cars total and it was

the third car that he encountered that drew his attention, and the
attention was drawn because it was about the amount of time it
would take for a vehicle to drive to the location it was at from the
scene of the crime.
Two, the speed of the vehicle, 13 miles an hour below the
normal traffic pattern or speed limits. And I understand that the
temptation here is to look at any one of the individual facts and say:
Is that enough? No. Is there anything wrong with driving below the
speed limit? That in and of itself, by itself? Well, it depends on the
circumstances: Frequently not. If the driver goes below the speed
limit for the greater good, then of course it's wrong.

Back to the question where the officer testified that it was
about two hundred feet and he observed four occupants in the
vehicle. The suspects that were identified on the all-call, the radio
transmission business, were two in number, this officer saw four.
Then this officer saw all four turn and look at him as he went by at
this relatively slow speed; and then according to this officer these
individuals acted particularly nervous, like moving in excitement, so
then the officer turned around and saw what could be described as
a premature turning on of the blinker in some fashion, which again
still further heightened his suspicions.
So the officer, in his training and experience, when he
noticed the scene -- first of all you've got a vehicle that proximitywise and time-wise could be the vehicle. Now [defense counsel]
points out: How do you know which way they went? Well, they
didn't know. All they knew was this robbery occurred and that the
guy left on foot and subsequently this officer saw interesting
conduct in a vehicle that drew his attention.
So based upon a totality of those circumstances, all of those
listed by the officer which I'll adopt herein by reference, at this point
I'll deny the motion to suppress, although I will again say that it's
razor thin. But I draw on this Gascon case because it's really
parallel, in my mind, to the facts that are stated and the reasonings
stated . . . .
(4/16/08 Tr., p.86, L.25 - p.89, L.19.)

4.

The District Court Correctlv Concluded Deputv Moore's Testimony
Established A Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion To Justify The
Traffic Stop

The district court's rendition of some of Deputy Moore's specific testimony,
as well as all the other circumstances listed in Deputy Moore's testimony, which
the court adopted by reference, provides the following summary of factors
justifying Deputy Moore's traffic stop:
(1) Proximity: given its location and time when spotted by the deputy, the
suspect vehicle was within the "window of possibility to have traveled from
Rupert to that location." (4116107 Tr., p.41, L.21 - p.43, L.24; p.47, L.25 p.48, L.5; p.54, Ls.18-21.)
(2) Unusuallv slow driving: the significantly slower speed than the posted
speed limit (i.e., 13 miles per hour less) was, in the deputy's experience, a
possible indicator that the driver was attempting to avoid police scrutiny.
(4116107 Tr., p.41, L.5 - p.42, L.20.)
(3) Suspect's description: the observation that the vehicle had four
Hispanic men inside was consistent, in regard to race, with the description
of the two men who robbed the Maverik store. (4116107 Tr., p.53, Ls.2024; p.56, Ls.5-12.)
(4) Keen interest in deputv's presence: as he passed the other vehicle,
Deputy Moore noticed all four occupants in the vehicle were watching him
with "varying expressions," and "showed a keen interest" in him as an
officer. (4116107 Tr., p.46, Ls.20-24; p.47, Ls.14-16; p.53, Ls. 20-21; p.55,
Ls. 1-4.)
(5) Detailed description of "furtive" movements: after he passed the other
vehicle, Deputy Moore described the actions of the four men variously: (a)
"quite a bit of movement, turning around, looking . . . n]ust bouncing
around inside," (b) "subjects turning around and looking at me, subjects
turning and talking to each other in a rushed manner," and (c) "[i]umping
around or moving around in a car really fast." According to the deputy,
such conduct suggested the occupants might be removing clothing, hiding
weapons, or securing items they did not want found. (4116107 Tr., p.48,
Ls.13-22; p.55, L.7 - p.56, L.4.)
(6) Unusual use of lane change signal: although admittedly legal, Deputy
Moore nonetheless took note that the suspect vehicle engaged in what, in
his experience, was unusual conduct by signaling a right hand lane

change before Highway 25 split from one to two lanes as it entered the
City of Paul. (4116107 Tr., p.49, L.8 - p.52, L.18; p.54, Ls.11-15.)
(7) Possible gana-connection: Deputy Moore noted a possible gang
connection between the description given of the two robbers and the "lowriding" conduct he observed by the occupants of the suspect vehicle: the
report of bandannas worn by the Hispanic individuals committing a
robbery "could -- or to me might have been some type of gang-type thing.
That's also in this area part of the culture of low riding." (4116107 Tr., p.53,
L.24 - p.54, L.2.)
Considering the totality of the above-listed circumstances outlined by
Deputy Moore's testimony, the district court was correct to conclude that the
officer articulated a reasonable suspicion to justify his traffic stop of the vehicle
Jimenez occupied.

In reaching its decision, the district court concluded the

principles of search and seizure law applied in State v. Gascon, 119 Idaho 932,
812 P.2d 239 (1991), have similar application to Jimenez's case
In Gascon, police officers received a radio dispatch notifying them of a
bank robbery and describing the bank robber.

Id. at 933, 812 P.2d at 240.

"No

description of a getaway car was provided, and no one knew for sure whether the
robber did in fact enter a vehicle on leaving the bank."

Id.

Based upon this

information, the police established a vantage point along one of the likely routes
the robber would take from the scene of the robbery.

Id.

The officers put out

cones diverting all traffic into one lane, requiring it to slow near a bridge that had
to be crossed if the robber wished to access the freeway.

Id.

Officers then

observed the cars and their drivers, looking for people that matched the
description of the robber.
passenger seat.
under the seat.

Id.

Id.

Id. As Gascon drove past, he twice reached under the

The officers stopped him and seized items partly visible

On appeal from the denial of his suppression motion, Gascon argued that
the stop of his car was illegal because the officers were not "able to match their
description of the suspect with the driver of the vehicle."

4. at 934, 812 P.2d at

241. The ldaho Supreme Court rejected this argument, however, stating that the
police were in a place where a robber was likely to flee and that Gascon's actions
of leaning over, once disappearing from view, "were aptly characterized as
suspicious and gave rise to a reasonable and articulable suspicion that Gascon
could have been involved in the robbery."

Id.

A review of the record in this case shows that the district court correctly
found, under the totality of circumstances, that Deputy Moore had reasonable
suspicion justifying the stop of the vehicle in which Jimenez was an occupant.
As in Gascon, Deputy Moore saw the vehicle in a location that was consistent
with the time it would have taken to travel from the Rupert Maverik store after the
r ~ b b e r y .Jimenez
~
attempts to reduce Deputy Moore's specific description of the
four men's "furtive movements" as simply saying they appeared "nervous," thus
setting up a straw man (i.e., mere "nervousness" during a police encounter) to
knock over. See Appellant's brief, p.22 ("Presumably, Deputy Moore found that
the passengers were nervous because they saw he was a cop. However, as the
ldaho Court of Appeals has found . . . ."), p.27 ("the passengers were nervous
and communicating with each other when they saw him"); see also Hernandez v.

m, 132

ldaho 352, 358, 972 P.2d 730, 736 (Ct. App. 1998) (special

Although the robbery suspects could have taken a different road in Jimenez's
case, the same was true in Gascon, where the court of appeals noted that the
police had set up a vantage point along one of the likely routes the robber would
take from the scene of the robbery. Gascon, 119 ldaho at 933,812 P.2d at 240.

concurrence, Schwartzman, J.) ("Nor does some vague reference to a so-called
"furtive movement" elevate the relatively innocuous and innocent behavior . . .
into the realm of "reasonable suspicion.")
However, Deputy Moore's testimony did not describe mere "nervousness"
or vaguely relate he had seen "furtive" movements by the occupants in the
vehicle.

See Appellant's brief, p.25 (contrasting Gascon to Jimenez's case,

stating "the officers [in Gasconl did not rely upon simply calling the driver's
movements 'furtive;"').

Deputy Moore's specific testimony bears repeating on

this point: he saw "quite a bit of movement, turning around, looking . . . [jlust
bouncing around inside," "subjects turning around and looking at me, subjects
turning and talking to each other in a rushed manner," and "[jjumping around or
moving around in a car really fast," which conduct suggested the occupants
might be removing clothing, hiding weapons, or securing items they did not want
found.

(4116107 Tr., p.48, Ls.13-22; p.55, 1.7

-

p.56, L.4.)

Deputy Moore's

testimony clearly described a scene of panicked scrambling action on the part of
the four men inside the vehicle.

To characterize such actions as normal

"nervousness" occurring during a police encounter strains credulity -- especially
since there was no face-to-face encounferwith the deputy, or even an attempt to
stop the vehicle, at that point in time. See State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 28586, 108 P.3d 424, 432-33 (Ct. App. 2005) ("Because it is common for people to
exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted with law enforcement regardless of
criminal activity, a person's nervous demeanor during such an encounter is of
limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion.")

Jimenez also argues that State v. McAfee, 116 ldaho 1007, 783 P.2d 874
(Ct. App. 1989), is similar to his case, and shows that Deputy Moore's traffic stop
was based only on a "hunch" of criminal activity. (Appellant's brief, pp.26-27.)
However, McAfee is inapposite.

The police officer in that case had no

information other than the innocuous driving (prolonged stop at a stop sign) of
the defendant at night in a high crime area upon which to form a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify a traffic stop. The court of appeals in
McAfee did not specifically reject as factors for determining the reasonableness
of an investigatory stop the fact that McAfee lawfully hesitated at the stop light for
a longer period than usual and the fact that he was driving late at night. Rather,
the court held that these factors alone were not sufficient to constitute
"reasonable and articulable suspicion" to believe that McAfee was engaged in
illegal conduct. McAfee, 116 ldaho at 1009, 783 P.2d at 876. The court appeals
focused on the idea that, "Iflor an investigatory stop to be reasonable, it must be
accompanied 'by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is
about to be, engaged in criminal activity."'

id. (quoting United States v.

Cortez,

449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695 (1981) reh'g denied 455 U.S. 1008, 102
S.Ct. 1648 (1982)) The McAfee decision further explained:
However, McAfee did not drive erratically, nor was he
slumped over the steering wheel. He parked, shut off the lights and
engine, laid across the passenger seat and fell asleep. The
magistrate found that the officers had not received any reports that
may have aroused their suspicion of McAfee or his van. Nor was
there testimony that the police were looking for a particular
individual or vehicle wanted in connection with other criminal
activities. The officers were simply suspicious because the van had
stopped. McAfee was legally parked in a place where he had a right
to be. Apparently no traffic laws or other law had been violated.

Therefore, upon examining the "whole picture" of McAfee's
situation, we conclude that there was no reasonable articulable
suspicion that could form the basis of a lawful seizure.
Id.
-

In contrast to the main concern of the court of appeals in McAfee, that no

crime was reasonably suspected to have even occurred, here, Deputy Moore
responded to a contemporaneous report of a convenience store robbery. He did
not conduct the traffic stop merely because he had an undifferentiated "hunch"
that a crime may have occurred -- he knew one had.
Unlike McAfee, the facts surrounding Deputy Moore's traffic stop, viewed
together, provided the deputy with a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify
the stop. The record shows Deputy Moore saw the vehicle in a location which it
might have been following the robbery, that vehicle was traveling well below the
speed limit, the occupants of the vehicle were the same race as those who
committed the robbery, the suspects took great notice of Deputy Moore's
presence as they began to pass his patrol vehicle, and after passing, they were
moving or jumping around in the car really fast, as if they were concealing
something.

Additionally, although perhaps of less significance, the deputy

noticed that the suspect vehicle turned its blinker on before Highway 25 split into
two lanes, which was unusual (even though lawful), and there was some hint of
gang-related behavior by both the reported robbery suspects (wearing of
bandannas) and the occupants of the suspect vehicle (low-riding).
Based on all of the factors enunciated by Deputy Moore, the district court
correctly concluded he had a reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop of the

vehicle. Jimenez has failed to show error in the district court's determination that
the stop of the vehicle was constitutionally reasonable.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the judgment entered upon Jimenez's
conditional guilty plea to one count of robbery be affirmed.
DATED this 2othday of November 2008.
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APPENDIX A

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MINIDOKA
Case No.: CR-2006-3945
CR-2006-3948

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.
MARC0 A. JIMENEZ and RAMIRO
REYES NEVAREZ,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ON APPORTIONMENT OF FUNDS FOR
EXPERT WITNESS

Defendants.

The above captioned cases have been consolidated solely for the purpose of hearing the
defendants' Motions to Suppress. In connection with the Motions to Suppress, the defendants
have requested funds for an expert witness. A hearing on the defendants' Motion for
Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness was held on March 9, 2007 in open court. Mr.
Marco Jimenez was represented by Mr. Kent D. Jensen. Mr. Ramiro Reyes Nevarez was
represented by Mr. Clayne S. Zollinger. The state was represented by Mr. Jason D. Walker,
Minidoka County Prosecuting Attorney. The court heard argument on the motion and the matter
was submitted for decision. The court now enters the following:
MEMORANDUM DECISION
1. Facts.
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The alleged facts, so far as relevant to this decision are as follows:'
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on October 27,2006, two men committed an armed
robbery at the Maverick convenience store in Rupert, Idaho. They wore bandanas, hats
and gloves so the store clerk could only observe the area around their eyes. After the
robbery the clerk immediately called the police. At about the same time, Sheriffs Deputy
Joe Moore was on patrol about three miles west of Paul Idaho traveling east on Highway
25. Deputy Moore received a radio message that there had been an armed robbery at the
Maverick store in Rupert. He tumed on his emergency lights and began to speed up
intending to go the scene of the robbery but then decided that because the robbery had
occurred minutes before and he was driving towards Rupert he might encounter the
suspects traveling in the opposite direction if they chose to leave Rupert by that route. He
then tumed off his emergency lights and proceeded east on Highway 25. As he was
traveling through Paul, he saw a westbound car approaching. He saw no other cars on the
highway. Using his radar, the deputy determined that the approaching car was traveling
42 MPH in a 55 MPH zone. The deputy stated that this low speed made him suspicious
because people usually drive at approximately or a little above the speed limit and that
they do not often drive 10 MPH or more below the speed limit without a reason. He
believed that if someone had committed the robbery in Rupert they would either be
leaving the area at a slow speed so as not to draw attention or a high rate of speed. The
deputy then adjusted his own speed so that he would pass the oncoming vehicle near
Stimpy's, a small gas station and convenience store east of Paul. The deputy testified that
he wanted to pass the vehicle in that area because there were lights at Stimpy's and he
could better observe the car and occupants. The deputy slowed to 35 MPH and the other

I

The facts are summarized from the transcript of Mr. Jimenez's prelirninazy hearing held on November 22, 2006,
pp. 51-95.
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car continued to approach at 42 MPH. The deputy testified that as the cars passed he
observed four Hispanic individuals in the car and he noticed bald heads. The deputy then
testified as follows:
Q: After your patrol vehicle passed this vehicle, what did you do?

A: I left my rear lights off and started to slow down and looked in my rearview
minor-side

mirror and observed-in

fact when I drove by once I was made,

once I was observed to be a police vehicle I got quite a bit of reaction from inside.
Q: And could you describe this reaction?
A: Well, initially it was merely just a-I

don't know any other way to say it than

like goodness or exclamation.
Q: And how did--can you describe why you perceived that?

A: I-because

of wide eyes, open mouth, or-

Q: From the individuals in the car?
A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: Okay. Other than that type of, I guess, surprise look on a face, what else do
you recall?

A: At that point, that was it. That and I saw some bald heads which the light
enhanced, which made me aware of it, which has no bearing 1 guess, but that's
what I observed. I slowed, looked in my minor, saw a lot of furtive movements.
Q: And what do you mean by that?

A: Shifiing around, moving. I didn't actually see anybody change seats, not that
deal, but within the two going in the back together and one in the front moving
around like that, so at that point is when I decided to turn on the vehicle and
investigate it further.
Q: What did that type of hrtive movement if anything, mean to you?
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A: Well, in some cases you can-you

can hide things, you can get things. You

can be reaching for a weapon. You can be storing a weapon, just none of it good
that I, you know, when you have that reaction at that time of night when you're
observed to be just a police vehicle, most people don't react like that. You have a
lot of kids that turn around and look, but that's different to turn around and Look.
Nobody turned around and looked.
Q: At you that night?
A: Not after I passed them because I watched-it

was a few feet, probably 60, 70

feet before my mirror picks up the image, you know, there's that much. They
could have I guess, but it was mostly just turn to the side when I passed and then
when I went back, I looked, they were moving around.
Q: So is it fair to say that-that

the reaction that you observed and the four

individuals in the car that night was unusual based on your experience in law
enforcement?
A: Extremely unusual and very suspicious.

Q: And upon observing that what did you do?
The deputy testified that he turned around and followed the suspect vehicle and he
observed "some furtive movement-not

quite as exaggerated as through the mirror." He also

observed that the vehicle signaled for a longer distance than usual before turning into the right
lane where the highway becomes a four lane highway near Paul. The deputy thought that was
unusual and indicated that the driver was trying to do everything right and "over-exaggerated."
The deputy then initiated a traffic stop. On cross examination the deputy admitted that the
closing speed of the vehicles as they passed was over 70 MPH and that he did not observe the
suspect vehicle violate any laws prior to the stop.
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The defendants have filed motions to suppress evidence, asserting that the stop of the
vehicle was not supported by probable cause. In connection with their motions to suppress, they
have requested funds for an expert witness pursuant to I.C. 519-852. It is undisputed that both
defendants are indigent.

2. Applicable Law.

I.C. $19-852 provides, in part, that an indigent defendant is entitled "to be provided with
the necessary services and facilities of representation (including investigation and other
preparation)" at public expense. Our Supreme Court has explained the statute as follows:
The constitution does not require a state to provide expert or investigative
assistance merely because a defendant requests it. A defendant's request for
expert or investigative services should be reviewed in light of all circumstances
and be measured against the standard of "fundamental fairness" embedded in the
due process clause. Before authorizing the expenditure of public funds for a
particular purpose in an indigent's defense, the trial court must determine whether
the funds are necessary in the interest of justice. Such a review necessarily
involves the exercise of the sound discretion of the trial court, and a denial of a
request for investigative assistance will not be disturbed absent a showing that the
trial c o w abused its discretion by rendering a decision which is clearly erroneous
and unsupported by the circumstances of the case.
State 1,. Lovelace, 140 Idahc 53,65,90 P.3d 278,290 (2003).

I.R.E. 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as a
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of opinion or otherwise.

3. Analysis and Decision.

It is well settled that a traffic stop is a seizure of a person and that it implicates Fourfh
Amendment safeguards. Our Court of Appeals has held:
The Fourth Amendment safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures
applies to the seizures of persons through arrests or detentions falling short of
arrest. The stop of a vehicle is a seizure of its occupants and is therefore subject to
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Fourth Amendment standards. When the purpose of the detention is to investigate
a possible traffic offense or other crime, it must be based upon reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Because the stop of a vehicle and
detention of its driver is generally a detention of any passengers as well,
passengers have standing to contest the reasonableness of the detention.
State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650, 51 P.3d 461, 464 (Ct.App. 2002) (Internal citations
omitted). Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is determined upon a
totality of the circumstances. State v. Zuniga, 143 Idaho 43 1, 146 P.3d 697 (Ct.App. 2006). Once
it is shown that a warrantless seizure has occurred, the state has the burden of showing that the
seizure was within one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.
Here, according to the preliminary hearing transcript, the facts known to the deputy prior
to the stop were:'
1. An armed robbery had occurred a few minutes earlier in Rupert.

2. The deputy was driving towards Rupert on one of the routes the suspects could have
used if they were leaving Rupert.
3. The suspect vehicle was traveling slower than the posted speed limit.
4. The deputy allegedly observed furtive movements by the vehicle's occupants as he

passed them and then through his rearview mirror.
5. The driver of the suspect vehicle signaled for a longer distance than usual before
turning.
The defendants seek funds for an expert witness who will provide testimony about the closing
speed of the two vehicles, the short time the deputy would have had to observe the occupants of

The court recognizes that additional facts may have been known to the deputy but not disclosed at the preliminary
hearing.

-
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the car, and, presumably, whether the deputy could actually have observed what he said he
observed.
The closing speed of the vehicles can be readily determined arithmetically as can the time
the deputy could have realistically observed the suspect's car. 77 miles per hour equals 112.9
feet per second. The accuracy of the deputy's statements about what he observed at night while
the vehicles were passing each other and then through his rearview mirror after the vehicles had
passed can, if necessary to decide this case, be determined by the court without the assistance of
an expert witness. It is the fact-finder's function to judge the credibility of witnesses. C ' State v.
Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1220 (2003) (Polygraph evidence inadmissible--expert's opinion

admissible up to the point where opinion would require expert to pass on credibility of witness).
The court finds that denial of the services of an expert witness at this stage of the proceedings
will not deny the defendant of the fundamental fairness required by the due process clause.
Therefore, an expenditure of funds for that purpose is not necessary in the interest of justice.

ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants' Motion for
Apportionment of Funds for Expert Witness is DENIED.
Dated March 22,2007

hdn Melanson, District Judge

78
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON APPORTIONMENT OF FUNDS FOR EXPERT WITNESS - 7

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
n

IICUL~I
2k'

The undersigned hereby certifies that on 1
, 2007, I served
the foregoing document, MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON
APPORTIONMENT OF FUNDS FOR EXPERT WITNESS, upon the following in the
manner indicated:
Mr. Kent D. Jensen
Attorney at Law
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